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IT’S ABOUT BLOODY TIME AND SPACE
LOLITA BUCKNER INNISS*
Abstract
Time frames relationships of power, especially in the context of law. One of the
clearest ways in which time is implicated in both law and society is via discourses about
women’s biological functions. This Article is an introduction to a larger project that
analyzes legal discourses regarding a crucial aspect of women’s calendrically-associated
biological functions: women’s menstrual periods. Over the course of the project, I
explore legal discourses about menstruation through the notion of what literary theorist
Mikhail Bakhtin calls “chronotopes”—a connectedness of temporal and spatial
relationships. Temporality, Bakhtin argues, is closely associated with certain
paradigmatic spaces, and the combination of shapes, ideologies, and identities. Legal
discussions of women’s menstrual bleeding are key sites for the discursive creation and
maintenance of certain ideologies of womanhood. These discussions appear in a wide
variety of contexts and in ways that either explicitly reference or implicitly index
ideologies of female identity. All are characterized by efforts to mark them as narratives
linked to other temporally prior or future moments, and are often indices of
chronologically or spatially related stigmas and taboos. While legal discourses of
menstruation do not give a complete account of the category “woman,” they provide
cogent examples of how womanhood ideologies are constructed in legal contexts.
INTRODUCTION
One of the clearest ways in which time is implicated in both law and society is via
discourses about women’s biological functions. Especially crucial to women’s roles in
biological timekeeping is the process of menstruation. Because of its roughly monthly
occurrence over multiple decades of a woman’s life, menstruation is—to borrow a word
from technology—a self-clocking process, one that is legible as a time-teller without the
need for a separate clock signal or other source of synchronization.1 Women across
cultures have long talked about their menstrual cycles as “my time of the month,” an
* Dean and Provosts’ Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School, Ph.D., LLM with Distinction,
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. J.D., University of California, Los Angeles; A.B., Princeton
University.
1

OLIVER C. IBE, FUNDAMENTALS OF DATA COMMUNICATION NETWORKS 26 (2017).
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expression that captures rather succinctly the personal and temporal nature of
menstruation.
Despite the self-regulatory nature of women’s menstrual periods, for centuries, girls
and women have frequently been required to diary the beginnings and ends of their
menstrual cycles, as if they could not take place without such external regulation.2 This
calendarization of menstruation is largely a method of feminine surveillance, one that
ensures that girls and women can themselves control, or have others control, their
abilities to reproduce.3 Menarche, or the first onset of menstruation, is the start of the
clock, for it is often seen as a sign of socially becoming a woman, of fertility, and of
sexual availability. This is true notwithstanding the fact that being in the midst of
menstruating is often deemed sexually unappealing and socially abhorrent.
Menstruation as a time-teller is perhaps not so unusual given that the human
condition mandates that we are all up against the clock, moving towards the ultimate end:
death. It is often said, however, that time governs women’s lives differently than it does
for men. This is captured in the centuries-old aphorism: “A man may work from sun to
sun, but a woman’s work is never done.” This saying is frequently addressed, directly or
indirectly, in literature on the concept of social reproduction—engagement in the
activities required to maintain and recreate life, both on a daily basis and over
generations. 4 Social reproduction is often gendered, as women undertake much of the
labor needed to ensure its occurrence.5 The notion of women’s unending work relates to
the notion of both time and space. The man envisioned in this folk saying leaves home, a
space of respite, journeys into the world of toil, and at the end of the day returns to claim
2

Lolita Buckner Inniss, (Un)common Law and the Female Body, 61 B.C. L. REV. ELEC. SUPPLEMENT I.-95, I.100 (2020) (citing Margaret H. Sanger, Family Limitation, in 1 DOCUMENTING FIRST WAVE FEMINISMS:
TRANSNATIONAL COLLABORATIONS AND CROSSCURRENTS 280, 282 (Nancy Margaret Forestell & Maureen
Anne Moynagh eds., 2012)).
3

Id.

4

Shirley Lin, “And Ain't I a Woman?”: Feminism, Immigrant Caregivers, and New Frontiers for Equality,
39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67, 77 (2016). For a more detailed discussion of social reproduction theory and
gender, see HEIDI GOTTFRIED, GENDER, WORK, AND ECONOMY: UNPACKING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2013);
KATE BEZANSON, GENDER, THE STATE, AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION: HOUSEHOLD INSECURITY IN NEO-LIBERAL
TIMES (2006).
5

See Mary Romero, Beyond Belonging: Challenging the Boundaries of Nationality: Nanny Diaries and
Other Stories: Imagining Immigrant Women’s Labor in the Social Reproduction of American Families, 52
DEPAUL L. REV. 809 (2003) (asserting that immigrant women are often used to reproduce the upper-middleand upper-class American, as well as worldwide, family lifestyles).
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his well-earned rest. In contrast, the ideal woman of this saying is ever ensconced within
the home. At home, the ideal woman works without ceasing, often laboring under the
belief that she (and all that she stands for) would cease without her work. This
hypothetical woman is an artifact of the cultural structuring of gendered labor roles, but
she is not only from days of yore. The COVID-19 crisis has brought heightened attention
to how even contemporary women who work full time jobs outside the home have faced
immense pressure to perform their work inside the home along with those outside jobs.
During this crisis, some women’s outside jobs have, without much notice, migrated into
the home with them, complicating and enlarging the already endless list of household
duties that many women shoulder. Notwithstanding contemporary ideas about the
usefulness of gender, or gender binaries, it remains the case that time is a device of its
very own for women, or women-identifying people. There is a “women’s time,” and it is
“cyclical, natural, task-oriented, relational, and embedded.”6
Women are thus both temporal and atemporal agents, acting as biological
timekeepers via the presence and absence of the biological imperative of menstruation,
and yet acting outside of standard formulations of time because of certain social and
cultural norms. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the extent to which women characterize their own
social, legal, and political progress is itself often related to time and space. This may be
an effort to harness the power of chronological assessments, and ultimately of historical
judgments, in ways that have often eluded women as a class. To have one’s actions fixed
in time is to have one’s spatial presence acknowledged. This is seen in how eras of
feminism have been described in chronological “waves.”7 Whether and how these waves
have operated and served women is part of a question-begging generation gap in
feminism. One aspect of the larger feminist program, assuming for a moment that there is
any one single program, is thus for women to lay claim to time and to their own space
within time. But in order for women to do that, there must be a broader acknowledgement
of the workings of legal and social time-space dynamics in relation to women’s bodies.

6

VALERIE BRYSON, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF TIME: FEMINIST THEORY AND CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 122
(2007)
7

While the phrase “first wave” has been commonly used and understood for decades, it is important to note
that the idea of a first wave was not deployed until the 1970s, when it was used in counterpose to the second
wave of the feminist movement. First wave is thus a post hoc description of the first wave by women who did
not themselves experience the first wave. See, e.g., MARLENE LEGATES, IN THEIR TIME: A HISTORY OF
FEMINISM IN WESTERN SOCIETY (2001).
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Women’s menstrual bleeding is a key site for querying time, space, and the time-space
continuum, which has particular importance in legal contexts.8
This Article is an introduction to a larger project that analyzes legal discourses
regarding crucial aspects of women’s calendrically-associated biological functions: the
start, conduct, and end of women’s menstrual periods. The project explores legal
discourses about menstruation through the notion of what literary theorist Mikhail
Bakhtin calls “chronotopes”—a connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships. 9
Temporality, Bakhtin argues, is associated with certain paradigmatic spaces. The central
claim of this Article is that discussions of women’s menstrual bleeding in legal contexts
are important aspects of the discursive creation and maintenance of certain time- and
space-related ideologies of womanhood. After this introduction, the Article proceeds by
briefly addressing the meaning and nature of discussions of blood in socio-legal discourse
and especially of menstruation is such contexts. Next, the Article offers a personal
narrative that helps to explore one common focus on menstruation seen in legal cases:
discourses about child sexual abuse. The Article then explains the use of chronotopes in
the context of legal discourse. It concludes by suggesting that while legal discourses of
menstruation do not give a complete account of the category “woman,” they provide
cogent examples of how womanhood ideologies are constructed in socio-legal contexts.
I. Law Talk About Blood
Discussions of blood are ever-present in legal discussions. Blood in the context of
law is frequently about life and death, which are both ultimately other aspects of the
relationship between blood and time. Legal discourse about blood also frequently evokes
civic belonging and relatedness, signaling attachments to members of a particular polity
and thus to geopolitical spaces. Consider the Latin expression jus sanguinis, which
translates as “right of blood.” This refers to the possession of legal or political rights

8

Besides menstruation and its absence, another site for chronotopic analysis of legal discourses involving
women’s biological functions involves pregnancy. Inniss, supra note 2, at I.-100 (“[B]ars on abortion are
rendered more illegible because the premise for these bars has traditionally rested upon a temporally-based
assessment that measures the development of the pregnancy by stages and then applies names such as
blastocyst, zygote, embryo or fetus, going from the stage immediately after conception and moving up to the
stage closest to birth.”).
9

M. M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION 84–85 (Michael Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael
Holquist trans., 1981).
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within a nation state that comes from biological descent via one or both parents.10 Blood
has also played a role in religious, racial, and ultimately legal definitions of belonging in
the context of the European settlement of the Americas.11 Blood often stands for the
nation itself and for national sacrifices in times of war.12 In the latter context, blood
frequently signals victimhood and heroism. Blood, in all of these contexts, is a metonymy
of some larger idea or ideology.13 Blood as a metonymy captures the legal, political, and
social norms and processes that shape geographic boundaries and belonging within such
bounds.14 What is often unstated in these rhetorical outings, however, is that what we
typically mean is men’s blood.15

10

MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 879 (2018). Jus sanguinis
citizenship is contrasted to jus soli, citizenship by place of birth. Most jurisdictions use some combination of
the two systems in determining citizenship rights. Id.
11

“Limpieza de sangre,” literally “cleanliness of blood” was a concept developed in fifteenth-century Spain
that referred to a person without Jewish, Muslim, or heretical ancestry. This became a concern in Spain and
in some other nations when persecuted Jews and Muslims began converting to Christianity in significant
numbers. These conversos, or converts, were dubbed New Christians, and those claiming to have limpieza de
sangre were designated Old Christians. Often only those with limpieza de sangre could emigrate to the
Americas, obtain inheritance rights or gain other opportunities. Once some European settlers reached the
Americas, limpieza de sangre also came to include European racial “purity” exclusive of indigenous or
African mixture. MARIA ELENA MARTINEZ, GENEALOGICAL FICTIONS: LIMPIEZA DE SANGRE, RELIGION, AND
GENDER IN COLONIAL MEXICO 270–73 (2008).
12

SARAH J. PURCELL, SEALED WITH BLOOD: WAR, SACRIFICE, AND MEMORY IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA
(2002). The author writes in reference to the Revolutionary War: “Public memory meant that the ‘wounds,
that stream’d with blood’ no longer belonged only to the men who fought but to the whole American people.
Through the process of commemoration, mere public memory of the war was transformed into the ‘Bloodbought fame’ that would become the new nation’s reputation.” Id. at 20.
13

Jules Zanger, Metaphor into Metonymy: The Vampire Next Door, in BLOOD READ: THE VAMPIRE AS
METAPHOR IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 17, 20 (Joan Gordon & Veronica Hollinger eds.,1997). Metonymy is
a rhetorical device that pairs or replaces words from the same semantic field in order to communicate ideas.
14

NICOLA PRATT, EMBODYING GEOPOLITICS: GENERATIONS OF WOMEN’S ACTIVISM IN EGYPT, JORDAN, AND
LEBANON 5–6 (2020).
15

For example, in the Spanish notion of limpieza de sangre, or cleanliness of blood as a construct connoting
religious and racial purity and ultimately eligibility to civic membership, blood purity was typically assessed
via male lineage. MARTINEZ, supra note 11, at 49–50. Jus sanguinis was also historically based on male
ancestry in many legal systems, including the United States. Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus
Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134, 2134–36
(2014).
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Discussions of women’s blood has often had a much narrower valence, both literally
and figuratively, and it is often centered on specific concerns,16 such as those seen in the
present project on women’s menstrual blood. Menstrual blood discussions, like broader
discussions of blood, may also represent rhetorical undertakings where one thing relates
to or takes the place of another in discourse.17 However, figurative discussions of
women’s blood offer a reminder that although metonymy can be used to highlight or
center concepts and ideas, it also may be used to obscure, subordinate, or suppress wider
meanings.18
In order to assess how menstruation discourses appear in legal discussions, I looked
at one narrow example of “law talk”: published legal opinions that discuss
menstruation.19 I designed Boolean search strings that would yield a group of cases that
was sufficiently representative in number and yet recent enough to reflect contemporary
ideas about menstruation. I thus used the following Boolean search string in Westlaw:
menstruat! & DA(aft 12-31-2018 & bef 01-01-2020).
This search yields seventy-one results, excluding secondary discussions of the issue. The
cases covered a wide variety of contexts, with many centering on medical malpractice,
health, and—most frequently present—sexual assault. One immediately striking feature
is that several of the cases are unpublished opinions. Modern courts sometimes forego
16

Consider, for example, that for decades across several U.S. jurisdictions there were laws that compelled
premarital and/or prenatal blood testing of women, ostensibly to prevent the passage of syphilis to offspring.
See ALLAN M. BRANDT, NO MAGIC BULLET: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF VENEREAL DISEASE IN THE UNITED STATES
SINCE 1880, at 150 (1985). Premarital and/or prenatal blood tests for women were, however, not only aimed
at protecting infants who might contract the disease. Such blood tests were also crucial to protecting the
sanctity of womanhood and motherhood, since an “innocent” woman, one who had no pre-marital or
adulterous sexual relations, could not have venereal disease unless she came into contact with a “sinful” man
after entering into a marriage. Id. at 35.
17

See generally DANA MEDORO, THE BLEEDING OF AMERICA: MENSTRUATION AS SYMBOLIC ECONOMY IN
PYNCHON, FAULKNER, AND MORRISON (2002) (asserting that there is a pervasive presence of menstrual blood
in some of the U.S. literary canon and that this “bloodiness” is symbolic of how the early American colonies,
and later the new states, were infused with feminine norms that offered both the possibilities of a “curse” and
a “cure” for the political ailments of settlers).
18
19

Zanger, supra note 13, at 17.

“Law talk,” or discourses about law, can occur in any number of contexts, including written and spoken
communications, and in formal and informal settings. It may, moreover, occur in communications by legal
and non-legal actors. See, e.g., Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking, Writing, and Entering the Discourse
of Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 489 (2002).
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formalized, representative decisions, choosing to leave some cases “unpublished,” that is,
some decisions are intentionally framed as not constituting a part of legal precedent. This
may be for many reasons, such as the volume of similar cases, the absence of legal merit
in some cases, and/or the need to ensure quality by limiting the number of published
opinions written.20 It is worth querying, however, the relationship of the topic here––
menstruation––to courts’ cross-jurisdiction decisions not to publish many of the cases.
Additionally, a number of the case narratives seen in the search results are
characterized by efforts to link menstruation to temporally prior or future moments, often
in the form of reports of prior, present, and future health or illness, and assertions about
prior chastity, or current and subsequent unchasteness.21 Several noteworthy cases
discuss menstruation as an almost protective talisman that sexual assault victims were
able to wield as a shield against initial or continuing sexual assault.22 Some cases were
clear in their articulation of time-place aspects of menstruation, such as where
menstruating girls or women were treated as pariahs and either exiled directly by fiat or
less directly by voluntarily withdrawing themselves from physical or social activities

20

Boyce F. Martin Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 181–83 (1999). While
some jurists have complained that the creation of unpublished decisions is a valid response to ballooning
numbers of cases wherein issues are repeated, others have expressed the concern that unpublished decisions
are sometimes of lower quality, and that not publishing decisions creates problems of “predictability,
accountability, responsibility, and reviewability.” William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Elitism,
Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 284
(1996).
21

See, e.g., Slats v. State, No. A-12313, 2019 WL 4302861, at *1–2 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2019) (“In
this appeal . . . [Slats] argues that since L.W. was menstruating at the time of the alleged assault, evidence
that she previously engaged in anal sex with her boyfriend while menstruating would tend to show that she
consented to anal sex with Slats.”).
22

See, e.g., People v. Ramos, No. A156046, 2019 WL 2521274, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. June 19, 2019)
(including the prosecution’s evidence that the defendant had vaginal intercourse with the child victim until
she began menstruating, whereupon the defendant ceased in order to prevent impregnating the child and
began other kinds of sexual abuse); see also Alonge v. Chappius, 12-CV-542 (KAM), slip op. at 2 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 16, 2019) (“[The assailant] told [the victim] that he wanted to see whether she had lied about
menstruating . . . . After [the victim] removed her clothing, the assailant told her to turn around . . . . [The
victim] then observed the man return down the stairs and enter the elevator.”); State v. DeJesus, 194 Conn.
App. 304, 306–07 (2019) (“When the victim was ten years old, she began menstruating, prompting the
defendant to stop the sexual abuse.”); Washington v. State, No. 01-17-00905-CR, 2019 WL 1064581, at *2
(Tex. App. Mar. 7, 2019) (“Appellant continued to have sexual intercourse with [the child victim] twice a
week until she began menstruating.”).
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during the time of menstruation.23 Yet other cases query whether women’s blood in
underpants is non-menstrual or menstrual, and, correspondingly, evidence of an alleged
child rapist’s guilt or innocence.24
Cases involving child sexual assault are particularly salient for chronotopic analysis.
Childhood is chronotopic in the utmost, for childhood is a time and a space apart from the
condition in which most standard human lives are spent: as adults. Childhood is, of
course, about chronological time, since it describes the temporal period before adulthood
begins. Childhood is also, however, inherently spatial, since the boundaries between
childhood and adulthood are akin to domains that vary across culture and within legal,
social, cultural, and other settings. The latter category of cases involved the assessment of
whether blood was menstrual or not; thus, the blood signaled not the usual frontier
between childhood and womanhood but between victim and non-victim status. This
category of cases has a particular resonance for me, as it relates to the first instance in
which I heard discussions of menstruation.
II. My Story About Women’s Blood and the Law
When I was six years old, my mother sent me to live with my aunt and her ten
children while my mother tried to recover from a bitter divorce and the difficulties that
ensued. I lived with my aunt for almost two years. When I arrived there, I was a babyish
(though not a baby) girl, and I had little exposure to or understanding of the ways of men
and women. When I left my aunt’s house to return to my mother, my understanding had
greatly expanded, thanks to the doings of my cousins. My aunt bore her first child at age
fourteen, and that child, her eldest, was seventeen when I was six. He was called Junior,
and he was a friendly, good-natured, chubby boy. Junior cared for all the younger
children and for the household besides. He was my aunt’s trusted lieutenant, and it was to
Junior that we went with all our problems. Junior was mother, father, and doting sibling
all rolled into one, for he offered both loving assurance and stern guidance, and he
cheerfully turned a blind eye to our minor misbehavior. But as reliable he was within the
house, Junior—once outside the house—had a penchant for trouble, much of which was
not of his own making.
23

See People v. Linderman, 2019 IL App (1st) 180472-U, ¶ 40 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 3, 2019) (noting that when
minor victim left her father’s house to avoid sexual contact, the father assumed that she left his home because
she was menstruating).
24

See, e.g., Whitley v. Farris, 793 F. App’x 680 (2019) (noting that the victim’s mother testified that she
regularly checked the victim’s underpants and never saw any blood); see also Mashburn v. State, 124 N.E.3d
637, 2019 WL 1475096, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2019) (citing evidence that the victim’s mother found
blood in the victim’s underwear before she had begun menstruating).
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There was very little money available at my aunt’s house, so the older children got by
however they could. For some of the more rascally of my aunt’s children, this often
meant five-finger discounts taken at local stores. For the good kids like Junior, survival
usually meant odd jobs around the neighborhood. One of Junior’s jobs involved doing
heavy housecleaning for a family in the neighborhood. Junior often regaled us with
stories about all the wonders of their home—appliances and plentiful food figured
prominently in these accounts. Adding to the wonder was the fact that Junior’s employers
were white, as were most of my aunt’s neighbors in the then semi-rural eastern Los
Angeles county town. I know now that the people for whom Junior worked were not rich;
none of the neighbors were, but they were much better off than we were in a household of
numerous children headed by my aunt and her sixth husband.
One day, a few hours after Junior had arrived home from working, the police came to
talk to my aunt. The police were no strangers at my aunt’s house, as some of the older
children had seen their share of run-ins with the law. So, I didn’t think much of the visit.
But this time the police visit involved something serious—something to do with a
thirteen-year-old who lived at the house where Junior worked, and blood, and panties. It
seems that the girl’s mother had found a pair of the girl’s bloodied underpants hidden
somewhere. When the mother, furious, confronted the girl about the bloodied underpants
and how they had gotten that way (since, to the mother’s knowledge, the girl didn’t have
her period yet), the girl told her mother that Junior had knocked her down on the kitchen
floor he was mopping and raped her, causing her to bleed. My aunt was livid, and she
told the policeman that the girl had lied, as Junior would never have done such a thing.
The girl, my aunt argued, was probably having her period and had hidden the dirty
underwear instead of washing them as she should. The police left without arresting
Junior, but their visit cast a heavy pall.
We children passed a sleepless night––a night made all the more frightening after one
of my cousins said that the white people (not just the girl’s family, but some nameless,
faceless, collectivized mob) might come and kill Junior because of what happened. Junior
was allowed to remain free pending months of hearings and trips downtown to see
important people in the courthouse and at the police station. Finally, the matter somehow
went away. I was never clear on how it was resolved, for no one would talk about it. If
the claims of rape of a young, white girl alone weren’t enough to take the story out of
familial discourse, the part about panties—and bloody panties at that—had the effect of
placing the story under almost judicial gag order. Junior stopped working as a
housecleaner for white people after that. I was left to wonder and piece it together.
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When I experienced this situation as a six-year-old, I was baffled. What was rape?
What was a period, besides the thing that came at the end of a sentence? Whatever these
things were, they both seemed to involve danger. But I was most fixated on the part of
the story about the girl bleeding in her underpants. It seemed terrifying, wrapped up as it
was with gender, allegations of sexualized violence, class, and race. As I grew older, the
story became emblematic of the silence, fear, and mystery surrounding women’s
menstruation. And the presence of such discussions in legal settings further added to the
complexity and confusion. Junior’s legal case, and the story of a thirteen-year-old girl’s
bloody underpants, lingered in my mind for years, and it has, in many ways, profoundly
shaped ideas of time and place, violence, subjectivity, race, sex, and gender. The story
was, I have come to understand, ideal for chronotopic analysis within a legal context.
III. The Chronotope and Its Role in Understanding Legal Stories
Bahktin’s chronotope was borrowed from early-twentieth-century relativity theory.25
The chronotope is “a unit of analysis for studying language according to the ratio and
characteristics of the temporal and spatial categories represented in that language.”26 In
its simplest meaning, the idea of the chronotope seeks to explain the fundamental
relationship between time and space in literary contexts, and their functions in specific
literary genres. Chronotopic analysis of literature involves a process wherein the readeranalyst looks at the actions of time and their descriptions in space. This may involve
actions occurring within specific, historically instantiated time periods. However, in its
most typical framing, the chronotope does not necessarily imply a historical
interpretation. Chronotopes are mechanisms wherein time and space are deeply related,
often interdependent, but not in lock step. Use of chronotopes demonstrates how all
events benefit from being viewed in a time-space prism. For this reason the concept of
the chronotope also provides a particularly useful perspective for querying legal
discourses.27 They are especially useful in assessing discourses that address women in
biopowered time-space frames.28
25

BAKHTIN, supra note 9, at 84.

26

Id. at 425.

27

Scholar Mariana Valverde has, for example, used the chronotope as a framework for analyzing the spatiotemporal workings of law and other forms of governance. See MARIANA VALVERDE, CHRONOTOPES OF LAW:
JURISDICTION, SCALE AND GOVERNANCE (2015).
28

Biopower is a concept created by Michel Foucault. It concerns the ways in which contemporary nation
states wield their regulatory regimes in order to achieve “the subjugations of bodies and the control of
populations.” MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY VOL. 1: THE WILL TO KNOWLEDGE 140 (1998).
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What does chronotopic analysis yield for legal discourses, whether they occur in
legal decisions or in my story? Performing a chronotopic analysis requires first
identifying the time-space aspects of a legal story and, next, determining their meaning.
My story requires the reader-analyst to recognize that it is told from the perspective of a
young child, and that the story focuses on two other children. Hence, it occurs well within
the time-space arena of childhood. Next, it implicates race, which itself is rich in
chronotopic import. Social divisions between Black and white people, divisions at one
time explicitly created by formal law, are creatures of both time and space.29 In addition,
the story involves distinctions in class and, relatedly, a reverse of gendered work
expectations—my cousin Junior, a large, teenage, Black boy, performed housework for a
white family, laboring in the house instead of in the more masculine space of the
outdoors.
Moreover, the alleged assault was said to occur at the heart of the white home—in
the kitchen. The kitchen is itself a womanly space within a womanly space.30 The kitchen
has also long had racial connotations, given the history of Black women’s employment in
the kitchens of white homes in the United States.31 Before and for the decades
immediately after the general emancipation of enslaved Black people in the United
States, cooking for white families was one of the primary jobs that Black women
performed. This was so much the case that by the end of the nineteenth century there was
even a popular, mainstream craze for “mammy” cooking that appropriated the voices and
recipes of Black women domestics.32
29
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Next, chronotopic analysis of my story is characterized by a tension between two
distinct, although connected, temporalities: the history of the alleged crime and that of the
investigation through which the history of the crime is progressively reconstructed. These
stories are carried by a first-person narration. But most central to the story, and what
makes its recounting highly relevant here, is that it involves a discussion of menstrual
blood in a legal context. Menstruation, as discussed earlier, is a key site for chronotopic
analysis, existing as it does to create time-space boundaries in how we understand
womanhood. The role of that blood in determining guilt and innocence is also crucial to a
chronotopic analysis, for guilt and innocence may themselves be thought of as
determinations along a time-space continuum.33
CONCLUSION
It has long been understood that gender is culturally produced, and that production is
largely accomplished via discourse.34 This does not mean that no other mechanisms act to
inscribe gender or that there are no material bases for the creation of gendered subjects.
Rather, discourse creates and maintains social norms that materialize bodies and sex. The
term “woman” is often underexplained because it fails to fully account for intersectional
modalities such as race, class, or ethnicity.35 But another area where discourse of
womanhood often falls short is in articulating the importance of both time and place in
women’s lives and how those factors contribute to defining womanhood. Here is where
the chronotope has some of its greatest purchase. Chronotopic analyses call for a
consideration of how time and space work in tandem to create meaning. The notion of the
chronotope makes it possible to grasp various aspects of the role of time and space that
resist a fine analysis of descriptive passages assessing the meaning or the characteristics
of time space. By combining time and space, the chronotope takes into account both the
peculiarities of the narrative (because space unfolds there in time) and the characteristics
of time, which dynamically affect the dimensions of space.
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